Portrait of Junko Oguri

I am a Ph.D. candidate in Finance at the Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University. My research interests include financial intermediation, international finance, and macrofinance.

During my Ph.D., I have held visiting research fellowships at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, the Federal Reserve Board, and the Bank for International Settlements.

Prior to my Ph.D., I spent five years at the Bank of Japan working on financial markets and banking regulation, including foreign exchange intervention and the finalization of Basel III. I then worked as a research associate at the Yale Program on Financial Stability.

I am on the 2026-2027 academic job market.

Contact: junko.oguri[at]kellogg.northwestern.edu
CV: Link to PDF


Job Market Paper

Ample Reserves for Whom? The Role of Foreign Banks in U.S. Monetary Policy Implementation with Cristoforo Pizzimenti (PDF, SSRN)

Share of Balance Sheet Components: Domestic Banks and Foreign Banks: 1982-2025

  • Awards and Fellowships: ECB Lamfalussy Research Fellowship (2025); Brattle Group Ph.D. Candidate Awards for Outstanding Research (WFA, 2026)

  • Selected Presentations: AFA (Poster), MFA, BIS–CEPR–Gerzensee–SFI Conference on Financial Intermediation, ECWFC, WFA, Carey Finance Conference (scheduled), ECB Conference on Money Markets (scheduled)

Abstract (click to expand)

This paper shows how foreign banks’ reserve demand constrains the Federal Reserve’s balance-sheet normalization under its ample-reserves framework. Despite their modest share of U.S. banking activity, foreign banks have at times held more reserves at the Fed than domestic banks combined. Using reserve-supply shocks, we uncover an asymmetry in reserve adjustment: foreign banks absorb substantial reserve inflows during quantitative easing (QE) but do not release reserves symmetrically during quantitative tightening (QT), shifting adjustment toward domestic banks. We find that reserves at the Fed provide liquidity insurance for foreign banks’ global dollar lending. Banks with larger dollar lending exposures retain more reserves, including during QT. A heterogeneous reserve-demand model shows that these persistent global liquidity needs raise the minimum reserve supply required for stable rate control, even with domestic liquidity needs unchanged.


Working Papers

Crowding Out Lending With Liquidity: The Case of the U.S. National Banking System with Tim Seida (draft available upon request)

Abstract

Analyzing the costs and benefits of liquidity regulation in the modern context is challenging due to the presence of other interventions whose effects commingle with the impact of liquidity regulation. This paper investigates the impact of liquidity regulation in a historical context in which liquidity regulation’s effects can be more effectively isolated from those of other policy interventions: the National Banking Era in the late 19th century United States. Our quasi-experimental design uses population-based cutoffs that determined the stringency of reserve requirements to identify the causal impact of liquidity regulation on bank lending. We present evidence that tighter liquidity requirements crowd out bank lending, illustrating a cost of liquidity regulation.


Quantitative Tightening in Segmented Interbank Markets with Cristoforo Pizzimenti (draft coming soon!)

Abstract

How far can a central bank proceed with quantitative tightening (QT) when banks differ in their demand for reserves and interbank trading is limited? We model a central bank choosing how far to reduce reserves through QT while limiting the risk of losing the control of monetary policy rate. Two banking systems can have identical distributions of aggregate reserve demand and identical average demand by bank type, yet require different reserve supplies. This difference persists even when aggregate demand is identical at every common funding rate. Reserves can be sufficient in aggregate but concentrated among banks with lower demand. If interbank trading cannot move enough reserves to banks with higher demand, the central bank must retain more reserves under the same allocation rule to meet its tolerance for funding stress. Our findings show that aggregate reserve demand alone need not be sufficient to determine how far QT can proceed in segmented interbank markets.


Works in Progress

Supply Chain of Synthetic Dollar Funding with Jialu Sun

  • Fellowship and Awards: Kellogg Corporate Finance Research Center Fellowship

Monetary Policy and Firm Financing in Emerging Markets with Pablo Sanchez and Rodolfo Erasmo Oviedo Moguel